Red Wolf: politically motivated DDoS collective expands 2025 target lists

Hacktivist roster adds Azerbaijan; government tallies show sustained availability pressure alongside backbone rerouting during surge periods

Red Wolf is a politically motivated DDoS collective whose public target lists expanded in 2025 to include Azerbaijan, where authorities and operators documented availability pressure, traffic rerouting during high-volume events, and sustained monitoring across government and media platforms. The group’s focus is disruption rather than data theft.

Profile

Red Wolf is presented in open reporting as a hacktivist outfit that posts target lists and short claims on public channels, highlighting bursts of denial-of-service against government information sites, municipal portals, and news outlets. Regional media in the South Caucasus state that Azerbaijan appeared on the group’s 2025 lists, prompting a formal warning to institutions that operate public-facing services (Report.az). A separate regional brief outlines the inclusion and frames the activity as politically motivated DDoS with cross-border target selection (Caliber.az).
Additional: APA

Tactics and typical targets

Public descriptions emphasize denial-of-service at the network and application layers, with volumetric floods and web-layer request spikes aimed at front-door web infrastructure. Targets most frequently cited in Red Wolf lists are government information portals, local-service sites, and media platforms, matching 2025 hacktivist patterns where availability disruption and publicity take precedence over intrusions or extortion. Industry telemetry tracking regional volumetric events provides the operational backdrop for such campaigns around Azerbaijan (FastNetMon brief).

Communications and signaling

Activity surfaces through short posts and target rosters that shift with current events. Local summaries point to a mix of states in Europe and the Middle East and note the use of public channels to advertise intended targets before or during traffic surges (Report.az).

2025 signals in the South Caucasus

Authorities and domestic outlets documented a late-summer DDoS event affecting Delta Telecom, a national backbone provider, with traffic routed via Azertelecom and Aztelecom to sustain availability while mitigation progressed. Public statements and analysis describe redundancy that limited user-visible disruption during the surge (Ministry statement, Aug. 21, Azernews analysis). In parallel, the national GovCERT reported continuing availability attacks against “information resources,” underscoring a multi-actor landscape in which Red Wolf lists appear (GovCERT Azerbaijan note).

Quantitative snapshot

Government and domestic media provide figures that frame the operating environment around these campaigns in 2025:

These counts aggregate indicators logged by national teams and describe detection workload and mitigation activity rather than outage duration (Azernews, Report.az).

Named clusters alongside Red Wolf

Official posts also describe activity by Arabian Ghost targeting Azerbaijan’s “information resources,” with emphasis on availability disruption and website impacts. The presence of multiple hacktivist labels in public notices illustrates how country-level service pressure may reflect overlapping campaigns rather than a single actor’s effort at any given time (GovCERT Azerbaijan note).

Timeline highlights (2025)

Where this intersects with wider tradecraft

Red Wolf’s DDoS posture sits within a broader 2025 trend of pressure on infrastructure that supports government and media services, with quick public signaling and short-burst impact. Related coverage on this site details how operational tempo can rise when infrastructure or tooling is in play; see the analysis of BERT ransomware and the report on TA415 activity using VS Code tunnels. For a regional picture of current campaigns that mention Red Wolf, see /azerbaijan-faces-sustained-cyber-pressure-as-hacktivist-targeting-expands.

Current picture

• Red Wolf is identified as a hacktivist DDoS collective that publicizes country-named target lists and claims availability impacts on government and civic sites. Report.az
• Azerbaijan appears on the group’s 2025 lists, with institutional warnings issued in Baku. Caliber.az
• National posts and industry telemetry describe backbone-level DDoS and traffic rerouting during surge periods. Ministry statement, Aug. 21, FastNetMon brief